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Targeting Pre-Operative Booking Processes to Decrease Risks of “Never Events” 
Abstract 
Problem: Wrong patient, wrong procedure, wrong site, and wrong side surgeries are such 
egregious errors that are known as “never events.” Root cause analyses can pinpoint a failure yet 
do little to determine if corrective action has reduced the risk of recurrence. 
Context: Monitoring surgical cases prospectively to identify weaknesses that could help 
identify specific risk factors to avert and move toward zero defects. The setting for this 
quality improvement project is a >300-bed Level III trauma hospital, where the risk of 
wrong-site surgeries and lack of standardized processes in the surgical pre-operative booking 
process was of concern to organizational leadership. 
Interventions: The project used The Joint Commission Center for Transforming Healthcare Safe 
Surgery Targeted Solutions Tool® (SS TST®) to identify, measure, and correct preoperative 
booking defects. Additionally, a pre/post intervention questionnaire was used to measure surgical 
schedulers’ process satisfaction.  
 Measures: The outcome measures were changes in the number and types of pre-booking 
defects. Evaluation of surgical scheduler staff satisfaction began with existing workflow 
practices and concluded with workflow change evaluation. 
Results: This project facilitated change in standardizing the perioperative process to decrease 
risk by 47%, a relative improvement of 53.4%, recognize scheduler concerns, and implement 
mitigating strategies. 
Conclusions: Using the SS TST®, the hospital and the participating physician offices recognized 
the risk associated with booking surgical procedures via phone versus written submission. 






Dissemination: The data was disseminated to the host facility, pilot test sites, and corporate 
leadership.  
Key Words: surgical scheduling, preoperative booking, wrong-site surgery, “never events,” error, 

























Section II: Introduction 
Background 
 Wrong-site surgeries (WSS) consistently rank in the top five of the Joint Commission’s 
annual evaluation of the most frequent sentinel events (The Joint Commission, 2020). When one 
of these surgical “never events” occurs, a hospital typically conducts a root cause analysis to 
pinpoint the hazards. It puts in place a set of policies or programs to reduce the risk of 
recurrence. Because these events are infrequent in any facility or hospital system and cannot be 
measured by incidence rates, it is rarely known if efforts put in place retrospectively have 
reduced the risk of the event happening again. Monitoring perioperative practices prospectively 
for weaknesses that could result in wrong-site surgeries rather than only looking back on what 
has occurred, can help identify risk factors so targeted risk mitigation practices can be 
implemented. Surgical procedures performed on the wrong patient, wrong site, or the wrong 
procedure (collectively known as wrong-site surgeries) can be catastrophic for patients, 
healthcare professionals, and healthcare systems.  
Problem Description  
More than 20 years ago, the National Academy of Medicine (NAM), formerly known as 
the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published the seminal report “To Err is Human” (Kohn et al., 
2000), bringing the magnitude of medical errors to the attention of the healthcare profession and 
the public. Wrong-site surgeries, as “never events,” receive outsize attention when they occur, 
yet the problem persists, with 40-50 WSS per week (~2400/year) in the United States (The Joint 
Commission, 2021). The unrealized problem at the hospital where the quality improvement 
project was implemented, was the lack of identification, measurement, and targeting of the risks 






were booked via phone, fax, email, hand-delivered documents, or through a website, using 
various forms, notations, and unapproved abbreviations. With no standardized booking process 
and many points at which errors could be introduced, the hospital welcomed implementing a 
quality improvement study to measure and mitigate the risk of pre-operative booking defects at 
the beginning of the perioperative continuum. 
No previous efforts at this institution to improve surgical scheduling had focused on pre-
operative booking defects, as it had not been viewed as either high-risk for error or cause for 
patient dissatisfaction. The DNP project lead proposed to the Chief Nursing Officer, the Chief of 
the Medical Staff, and the Director of Perioperative Services using the Safe Surgery Targeted 
Solutions Tool® (Center for Transforming Healthcare, 2009). The tool defines, identifies, 
measures, and targets prioritization for preoperative surgical booking defect risks and it matches 
targeted solutions to improve, sustain, and spread the quality improvements. The first goal of this 
quality improvement project was risk mitigation. The second goal of this quality improvement 
project was improved job and process satisfaction for surgical schedulers, both in-hospital and 
in-office. 
The surgeons alone were granted access to the scheduling template. The office schedulers 
then had to be “proxied” into this system by their surgeon, proving unwieldy and a source of 
frustration for the office staff and physicians alike. The Corporate Patient/Customer Experience 
Office has been working to implement a seamless, easy to access surgery booking capability. 
This new IT system upgrade will allow access to office staff to schedule surgeries and upload 
necessary orders and documents prior to patient arrival to Pre-Admit Clinic (PAC) and date of 
surgery in one step. Currently, this process is not a widely known option and has been a large 







The setting for this evidence-based change of practice project was a >300-bed acute care 
hospital with a Level III Trauma Center in Texas. Surgical schedulers in the hospital and the 
physicians’ offices reported the pre-booking processes as difficult to deal with due to phone wait 
times which were often upwards of 30 minutes; the online booking system at physician offices 
was not user-friendly, and there were multiple entry points for surgical scheduling at the hospital. 
Three in-house surgical schedulers handled bookings for up to 500 surgeons from over 60 
physicians’ offices for 18 operating rooms, for an average of over 14,000 surgical procedures 
annually. Most physician office schedulers used the phone to book surgical procedures or used 
their own procedures and forms, which they faxed, emailed or hand delivered.  
In the previous state, the Director of Perioperative Services and the Director of Patient 
Care sent multiple emails and texts during a patient’s Pre-Admit Clinic appointment or the day 
before a scheduled surgery to confirm the case. Even if booking errors or omissions were 
discovered in time and could be corrected, surgical setups may have needed to be reconfigured, 
surgical sets reprocessed or discarded, and surgeries postponed or canceled—all adding to 
hospital operational costs, staff frustrations, patient and family dissatisfaction, and the possibility 
of jeopardizing patient safety by delaying the surgery. If not discovered, the booking defects 
themselves could be entry points for wrong-site surgery “never” events. A simultaneous study 
was implemented via the healthcare system’s patient experience team to streamline the surgical 
continuum experience by standardizing the pre-operative process up to and including the day of 
surgery, due to pointed customer feedback where opportunities for improvement were noted. 
This facility’s mission is to advance health by providing expanded access to care with an 






of Perioperative Services, and the Director of Patient Care identified two gaps. First, as the 
healthcare system continued to prioritize safety, quality, and service, unidentified or unquantified 
risks left the organization vulnerable to sentinel events and associated liability. The commitment 
to provide a world-class experience and patient outcomes was undercut by less than stellar 
patient feedback. This patient feedback drove the hospital to streamline the pre-operative 
booking process concurrent with implementing the DNP project. 
Specific Aim  
The specific aim of the pre-operative booking defect quality improvement project was to 
reduce surgical booking defects transmitted from physicians’ offices to the hospital by 20% 
within eight weeks. The broader objective of the project was to introduce a practical, evidence-
based way to manage the risk of WSS proactively by identifying and attempting to correct 
preoperative booking defects. 
Available Knowledge 
PICO(T) Question 
In the formula set forth by Melnyk et al. (2017), a PICOT question was created to reflect 
the project aim, inform the literature search strategy, evaluate the evidence, and guide the design 
and development of the project. The PICOT question for this project was: For surgical 
schedulers in hospitals and physicians’ offices (P), how does identifying, quantifying, and 
correcting surgical booking defects (I), compared to current surgical booking practices (C), 
change the incidence of surgical booking defects and workflow/job satisfaction for surgical 









A review of the literature was performed on the CINAHL, PubMed, EBSCO Host, and 
RefWorks databases. The search terms used were surgical, scheduling, booking, errors, 
checklist, high-reliability organizations, operating room, robust process improvement, universal 
protocol, and human factors, with the Boolean operators AND and OR. The inclusion criteria 
were peer-reviewed research and non-research articles published in English between 2000 and 
2020, demonstrating evidence-based practices for inpatient or outpatient settings. The 20-year 
timeframe was chosen due to the paucity of evidence-based studies relevant to the PICOT 
question, and the choice to include seminal studies with outsize influence on the current body of 
evidence. Position papers advancing the interests of commercial entities and expert opinion-
pieces lacking references to evidence-based practices were excluded. The initial search returned 
615 articles. Inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied to limit studies to those that addressed 
the perioperative continuum and perioperative checklists, which brought the number of studies 
for further evaluation down to 464. 
Further changing the inclusion and exclusion criteria to identify studies that addressed 
checklists and methods to decrease perioperative patient harm returned 87 relevant studies. By 
reviewing abstracts, the number of studies that were chosen for appraisal decreased to 45. Only 
three studies specifically addressed the evaluation of pre-operative scheduling. Using the Johns 
Hopkins Nursing Evidence-Based Practice Evidence Appraisal Tools (Dang & Dearholt, 2018), 
16 studies were of sufficient quality to be included in this review The evidence level and quality 








Integrated Review of the Literature 
Six themes emerged from the review: a) the pre-operative booking process, b) 
perioperative checklists, c) strategies and tools for reducing the risk of error, d) human factors 
science, e) Lean Six Sigma (LSS) and Robust Process Improvement® (RPI) in healthcare, and f) 
high-reliability organization (HRO) tenets, all to help eliminate wrong-site surgery.  
Pre-Operative Booking  
Three studies (Brown et al., 2001; Clarke, et al., 2014; Wu and Aufses, 2012) focused on 
pre-operative booking in the perioperative continuum as a source of wrong-site surgery defects. 
All three called for a multidisciplinary team approach and standardized booking processes.  
In a retrospective study, Brown et al. (2001) identified risks associated with surgical 
interventions at two hospitals and two free-standing surgical centers in a U.S. urban healthcare 
system. Investigators compared 30-day published surgical schedules with actual surgeries 
performed to identify discrepancies that could lead to errors. Seven areas of potential risk were 
identified, three of which involved aspects of scheduling and preoperative documentation. The 
project task force found a lack of uniformity in the scheduling forms used by physicians’ offices 
and surgical schedulers, with inconsistent and incomplete information provided. Scheduling 
procedures reflected differences due to convenience, old habits, self-styled improvements, lack 
of protocol awareness, and lax enforcement of standard procedures if they existed. An 
improvement process was implemented with a single surgery scheduling form that met all site 
requirements and could be used to schedule procedures at any site in the healthcare system. 
Scheduling procedures were revised with the following points communicated and subject to 
enforcement: only written scheduling on the approved form would be accepted; an amended 






with abbreviations for left, right, or bilateral would be returned. Copies of the new forms and 
explanations of enforcement were distributed to all physicians’ offices and unit managers. A 
concurrent audit of all patients scheduled through the new preoperative process was conducted to 
evaluate the risk reduction strategies. Data collected revealed the persistence of inconsistencies 
from which an education, implementation, and monitoring program was developed. No data 
were reported on subsequent changes in compliance or reduction in wrong-site surgery 
incidence.  
Clarke (2014) documented the effects of miscommunication between the surgeon’s office 
and the operating suite on the occurrence of wrong-site surgeries. Data from a review of 541 
wrong-site surgery procedures reported to the Pennsylvania Patient Authority from July 2004 to 
June 2013 revealed 59 (11%) to be due to incorrect or incomplete information from the 
surgeon’s office, significantly higher (p<0.001 by the chi-square test) than 8% for the wrong site 
surgery registry. Information that was incorrect or insufficiently specific when scheduling or 
obtaining consent was the most common defect, cited in 50 of the 59 cases. Compensation for 
wrong-site surgery claims from the study that were brought to court and adjudicated averaged 
$158,560. 
 Wu and Aufses (2012) analyzed surgical scheduling errors identified through the medical 
event reporting system of a large U.S. academic and research medical center. Within 151 
booking errors identified over a six-month period, the most common error was wrong side 
booking (55, 36%), followed by incomplete information (38, 25%), wrong approach (15, 17%), 









 In a non-research review of 13 published articles on using perioperative checklists, 
Spruce, (2014), synthesized several findings. One, the creation of a checklist is only the first 
step. A checklist is merely a tool, and safe surgery cannot be achieved without team interest in 
the tool and constant communication about its use. Two, an explanation of why the checklist was 
created and a demonstration of the checklist used for processes in and around the operative 
setting are necessary. Three, the checklist must be read and “checked” directly each time, 
without fail. Four, checklists have greater value for multidisciplinary surgical teams than when 
used for a process within a single discipline.  
In a qualitative study to evaluate the effectiveness of checklist use in surgical settings, 
Conley et al. (2011), conducted semi-structured interviews with implementation leaders (n=2), 
surgeons (n=2), and an anesthesiologist in five Washington State hospitals. The hospitals 
selected were urban (n=2), suburban (n=2), and rural (n=1); they ranged in size from less than 10 
to more than 20 operating rooms. All five hospitals had initiated a surgical checklist 
implementation process between December 2008 through January 2009. Interviews were 
conducted with implementation leaders in September and October 2009 and with surgeons in 
October and December 2009. Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed question by 
question to identify distinguishing factors in the hospitals’ implementation processes. Results 
were refined in an iterative process and compared with findings from the investigators’ previous 
implementation research processes. Investigators identified seven characteristics of highly 
effective safe surgery checklist processes: active leadership, pilot periods, deliberate enrollment 
in checklist rollout, extensive discussion and training, multidisciplinary communication, real-






work of others, that effective checklist processes would be characterized by dedicated resources, 
frontline decision making, and local modification was not supported by Conley et al. 's study. 
The investigators emphasized the importance of behavioral factors in highly effective checklist 
implementation processes and the necessity for implementation leaders to clearly and repeatedly 
explain why and show how to use safe surgery checklists.  
Treadwell et al. (2014) conducted a systematic review of studies that described 
experiences with surgical checklists and strategies for successful implementation. Thirty-three 
studies returned from a search of the MEDLINE, CINAHL, EMBASE, and Cochrane Database 
of Controlled Trials published between January 2000 and October 2012 were included in the 
review. All studies described actual use of either the WHO checklist, the Surgical Patient Safety 
System (SURPASS) checklist, a wrong-site surgery checklist, or an anesthesia equipment 
checklist. The findings confirmed the association of checklists with increased detection of 
potential wrong-site surgery errors, decreased surgical complications (e.g., unintended retention 
of a foreign object), and better communication among the surgical team. Strategies for successful 
checklist implementation that emerged from the review included engaging institutional leaders as 
safe surgery champions, encouraging staff feedback on checklist implementation, considering 
feedback for process and checklist adaptation, and avoiding redundancies in existing systems for 
collecting information (e.g., multiple collection points for the same information). All the studies 
were confined to processes and events within the surgical setting. None addressed pre-operative 
booking forms or the role a standardized booking process might play in decreasing surgical 
procedure errors in the perioperative continuum.  
In a retrospective cohort study, Van Klei et al. (2014) investigated the extent to which 






related to checklist compliance. The study population was 25,513 adult patients undergoing non-
day case surgery in a tertiary university hospital. Data were obtained from electronic patient 
records and hospital administrative data. The main outcome measured was in-hospital mortality 
within 30 days after surgery. Effect estimates were adjusted for patient characteristics, surgical 
specialty, and comorbidity. After adjustments for baseline differences, mortality was 
significantly decreased after checklist implementation (odds ratio 0.85 at 95% confidence level). 
The effect was strongly related to checklist compliance and full checklist completion (0.44 
association at 95% confidence level). The underlying takeaway from the study was the need for 
full and consistent compliance with the WHO Surgical Checklist implementation to achieve the 
intended outcomes.  
DeVries et al. (2010) investigated surgical safety interventions outside the operating 
room to establish if improvements in patient outcomes could be achieved by targeting the entire 
surgical pathway. The pre/post study examined the effect on patient outcomes of a 
comprehensive, multidisciplinary surgical safety checklist. The checklist was implemented in six 
Netherlands academic centers and teaching hospitals with high standards of care. Results were 
compared to a control group of five hospitals with similar characteristics. Outcome data were 
collected from the prospective Dutch National Surgical Adverse Event Registration System 
(LHCR), a nationwide registration system that has been in use for more than 10 years. Baseline 
data were collected over three months for both sets of hospitals. Post-implementation data were 
collected three months post-intervention. The total patient population studied in the six hospitals 
was 3760 patients before implementation and 3820 patients post-implementation. The total 
number of complications per 100 patients decreased from 27.3 (95% confidence interval) at 






confidence interval). In-hospital mortality decreased from 1.5% (95% confidence interval) to 
0.8% (95% confidence interval), for an absolute risk reduction of 0.7 percentage points (95% 
confidence interval). Outcomes did not change in the control group hospitals. The investigators 
attributed the results to several factors, including the design of the checklist to incorporate all 
existing protocols and checks to provide a comprehensive framework for the surgical pathway. 
The continuity provided minimal information loss along the pathway and promoted 
interdisciplinary communication. Many processes were optimized in the participating hospitals 
by integrating discrete processes into a cohesive framework and standardization of protocols.  
Paull et.al. (2014) explored why some wrong surgery events are not caught by the steps 
of the Universal Protocol for safe surgery. The purpose of the study was to identify potential 
safeguards to add precautions upstream and downstream of the surgical events that are the focus 
of the protocol. In a retrospective study design, the U.S. Veterans Health Administration 
database of root cause analyses was queried for all cases involving incorrect surgical procedures 
between 2004 and 2013 to determine the relative frequency and characteristics of wrong surgery 
events with origins upstream or downstream to the Universal Protocol. Events were sorted into 
the two subgroups (upstream or downstream) by two clinicians with expertise in surgery and 
patient safety. From the initial query return of 308 wrong-site surgery events, 48 cases (16%) 
were identified as upstream or downstream errors, and further analyzed. Upstream errors 
included mislabeling, while downstream errors were associated with ineffective surgical 
processes. Surgical procedures that were particularly vulnerable to upstream or downstream 
errors included wrong level spine operations, wrong patient prostatectomies, wrong implant 
cataract procedures, and wrong-site skin lesion excisions. The recommendation from the 






implementation of safe behaviors that complement the surgical continuum and not to rely on the 
Universal Protocol alone to ensure safe surgical procedures.  
Clay-Williams and Colligan (2015) published a viewpoint paper in which they stated that 
large-scale implementation of tools such as the Universal Protocol checklist in the hospital 
setting is not as straightforward or effective as hoped or claimed. The authors argue that 
checklists in healthcare are best reserved for simple, easy to follow, standardized, and time 
critical processes. Expanding checklist use to complex and variable procedures may be confusing 
and require advanced skills and team commitment to sustain. Combining linear procedures 
(checklists) with complex processes (discussions) as attempted in safe surgery checklists 
contradicts what the aviation industry has done, as those two components never cross in the 
cockpit. Unlike aviation checklists, the Universal Protocol does not articulate clear roles for who 
should initiate and complete each step or define who is responsible for the checklist (such as the 
captain is inside the cockpit). In addition, the Universal Protocol does not afford individuals who 
may need to be performing other tasks the ability to do so. The authors warn that patient safety 
solutions will never be singular, straightforward, or self-sustaining given the complexity of 
quality improvement in healthcare.  
Human Factors 
Dr. Ronald Wyatt, medical director, Office of Quality and Patient Safety of The Joint 
Commission, evaluated the root cause analyses of all reported sentinel events (The Joint 
Commission, 2015). The three most prevalent findings related to errors were human factors, 
leadership, and communication. In Dr. Chassin’s 2013 article, he identified that within root cause 
analyses, themes re-enforced the premise that the Universal Protocol, which focuses solely on 






errors. Chassin determined that those factors prior to the untoward event (such as pre-op 
booking) must be examined. Leaders must evaluate human factor solutions to create a more 
reliable tool to prevent that never event occurring again. Second, Chassin stated that US 
regulatory bodies are not likely to positively affect patient safety unless they include Robust 
Process Improvement® (RPI ®) (Appendix B). Chassin saw regulatory mandates that did not 
incorporate RPI® as potentially obstructing progress toward High Reliable tenets. Third, Chassin 
stated that High Reliability, as a systematically implemented process, requires an effort to 
discover the causes of the failures within patient safety by focusing on the specified root cause. 
Finally, Reason emphasized three key components for utilization when developing any tools for 
use within healthcare (1990). Reason recommended ensuring these elements of Human Factors 
are included within tools, by making sure they are knowledge-based, rule-based, and skill-based 
(1990). 
Reason (2000) cited two theories for humans to be fallible, the actual person or the 
system. If the error is to be blamed on the person, there are the reasons for forgetfulness, 
intentionality, or moral weakness that can be revealed. Suppose the error is found to lie within 
the system. In that case, the explanations can be found in the conditions under which people are 
forced to work and try to build defenses to deflect error or the effects of their errors (often 
referred to as workarounds within healthcare). Reason states that healthcare should strive to 
move toward the High-Reliability Organization (HRO) goal of zero preventable harm by 
decreasing variability in human behavior. 
Eltorai (2018) performed a qualitative study looking at aviation principles and lessons 
translated into healthcare. Eltorai drew parallels between aviation and anesthesia (as the 






that both the pilot and physician are potentially faced. Both are often charged with saving lives 
and operating in a fog of unclear/incomplete direction. Eltorai stated that while many individuals 
tout HRO within healthcare, there are still factors missing which they believe will propel 
healthcare even farther toward zero preventable harm. One aspect highlighted here is that 
accident reporting and investigations in healthcare must shift from siloed “self-evaluation” by a 
risk manager within the organization where the mishap has occurred, to an outside agency 
performing the RCA. Instead of current practice, and with great insight, Eltorai shared the need 
for RCA decentralization from the organization itself wherein the members cannot be completely 
objective. RCAs should shift to a centralized mechanism and investigating body, paralleling the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) accident investigation process. 
Additionally, Eltorai included the benefits of simulation-based error analysis, which most 
facilities are now capable of performing by video-taping simulation scenarios to evaluate these 
errors in a no-harm, no-threat environment. This study offers a tremendous lesson learned in 
healthcare from aviation. This literature highlights the angles of incorporating human factors 
industries to afford systematic error review (Eltorai, 2018). 
Robust Process Improvement®/Lean Six Sigma  
In 2013, Dr. Chassin described the positive effects of the Targeted Solutions Tools® 
(TST®s) which utilize the change management strategies of RPI® with components included 
from Lean Six Sigma (LSS). The first TST® developed was with eight healthcare organizations 
evaluating hand hygiene, whereby RPI® (a compilation of Lean, Six Sigma and Change 
Management theories) was utilized with a noted 81% improvement with 11-month sustainment 
after implementation. Surgical booking prior to RPI® had a 39% error rate noting after RPI® 






shows these Improvements Seen in Four Projects Using RPI®.” (See Appendix C). Another 
component cited within this article, and demonstrating the success of the TST®s, is the 
adaptation and inclusion of High-Reliability Science into hospitals, with noted leadership 
commitment, the incorporation of principles and practice of a safety culture, with widespread 
deployment of performance improvement tools and methodology (Chassin, 2013). 
Mason et al. (2014) reviewed 23 studies that evaluated LSS within healthcare. Six 
common goals were identified: 1) optimize outpatient efficiency, 2) increase operating room 
efficiency, 3) decrease complications associated with surgeries, 4) decrease inpatient-based 
harms, 5) reduce mortality, and 6) limit unrequired costs and lengths of stay within the hospital. 
The themes from these studies showed an 88% enhancement with LSS utilization and LSS 
quality improvement initiatives, strongly correlating outcomes for post-operative patients.  
High-Reliability Science/High-Reliability Organizations 
High-Reliability Organizations (HROs) are fashioned after the aviation industry, where 
zero failure can be tolerated. This HRO model is the direction experts are trying to drive 
healthcare. Chassin et al. (2018) discussed the implementation of High-Reliability tenets within 
healthcare, noting that Cincinnati Children’s Hospital decreased their serious safety events by 
80% and realized an 80% decrease in lost time days after implementing HRO strategies. In 
Houston, Texas, Memorial Hermann, The Woodlands, after implementing the HRO tenets, 
realized their hand hygiene rate which began at 55%, increased to a 96% compliance rate. This 
work then spurred a hospital within their enterprise to achieve zero bloodstream infections for 12 
months and five facilities to achieve a 0% ventilator-associated pneumonia rate for a full year. 
These were all directly attributed to their improved hand hygiene from the utilization of HRO 






support and a very involved board, a multitude of safety initiatives (which included safety 
huddles at hospital daily observation briefs), and both were consistently excellent, (safe across 
all services and settings) (Chassin, et al., 2018). These components are also seen woven 
throughout the SS TST® and are exemplified at the facility evaluating the SS TST®, whereby 
senior leadership is intimately involved, there are observable inclusion of safety initiatives within 
daily work, and patient and staff safety are a palpable priority. 
Summary/Synthesis of the Evidence 
Having multidisciplinary teams use a standardized written process for surgical scheduling 
was the single method whereby facilities noted sustained success in decreasing risk for ‘never 
events’ (Brown et al., 2001; Clarke, et al., 2014; Wu and Aufses, 2012). The impact of 
preoperative booking errors on wrong-site surgeries is well documented (Conley et al., 2011; 
Treadwell et al., 2014; Van Klei et al. 2014), while studies solely focused on the effect of non-
standardized processes within pre-operative booking are lacking. The review of literature 
supported the need for consistent use of checklists (Spruce, 2014), the effects of human factors in 
using checklists (Reason, 2000), and the positive outcomes utilizing the tenets of Robust Process 
Improvement/Lean Six Sigma and High-Reliability Organization (Mason et al., 2014). Evidence 
from the literature supports improving the process for pre-operative scheduling by standardizing 
the pre-operative booking process.  
 











 From themes identified in the review of the evidence, appropriate conceptual and/or 
theoretical frameworks were selected to guide the project. Two theoretical frameworks were 
chosen, the Donabedian Medical Quality Improvement Theoretical Framework to improve 
patient and quality indicator outcomes and the Rogers Diffusion of Innovation Theory.  
The Donabedian framework was introduced in 1966 by Avedis Donabedian, a doctor and 
health services researcher. He set out with a strong determination to apply unbiased scientific 
principles (i.e., “standards of quality”) to patient care to improve outcomes (AHRQ, 2015; 
Berwick & Fox, 2015). The major concepts in the framework are structural measures, process 
measures, and outcome measures (AHRQ, 2015). Structural measures contain the components of 
evaluating health care, examining medical capabilities or methods, and implementing practices 
that ensure safe, excellent value healthcare exists. Process measures are indicative of what a 
healthcare worker may do to preserve or increase baseline healthy practices, for those not 
seeking healthcare but health, or those in need of interface with the medical community for 
evaluation or ongoing care, which will often include the utilization of established, evidence-
based processes for care. Outcome measures indicate the overall effect and bearing the medical 
continuum has on patients (AHRQ, 2015). This theoretical framework has quite a substantiated 
history in its evolution and has been utilized successfully by healthcare organizations. Pre-
operative booking has many moving parts and human factors intertwined within its system, thus 
evaluating the theoretical framework of the Donabedian model to improve patient and quality 
indicator outcomes while implementing the SS TST® is applicable. Structure asks if we are 






Process is asking what the predictive value is of performing as we have been trained 
(with evidence-based practice). Outcome asks if our actions cause adverse outcomes and if so at 
what interval and with what regularity. Then, looking at the framework in total, the question 
asked is if a pre-operative booking process based upon evidence and High Reliability 
Organization (HRO) tenets, especially in checklists, has created a safer, higher quality care 
setting for patients. The Donabedian model aligns with the pre-operative booking defect quality 
improvement project which strives to increase patient safety and the quality of care by 
identifying entry points for errors in the preoperative booking process that can lead to WSS. In 
many cases, pre-operative booking is a non-standardized, inefficient, and error-prone process. 
Therefore, developing the structure needed to improve quality patient care by identifying and 
targeting the risks identified in pre-operative booking enabled streamlining the processes of 
surgical scheduling to facilitate safer patient outcomes. 
The Rogers Diffusion of Innovation Theory (Rogers, 2003) was first introduced by 
E.M. Rogers in 1962 and has become one of the most well-accepted explanations of the 
continuum along which innovations are introduced and take hold. This theory is derived from the 
science of communicating, explaining how, over a period, innovation ignites and diffuses among 
a specific populace or formalized social structure. The five categories of “adopters'' are 1) 
innovators, 2) early adopters, 3) early majority, 4) late majority, and 5) 
laggards. Diffusion unravels itself in many ways and is extremely dependent on the types 
of individuals and innovation-decision processes utilized. The SS TST® used in this project is 
one tool that is dependent upon the dissemination of information. Any evaluation of the tool's 
success must include where stakeholders are on the “adopter” continuum. The stakeholder tool 






current level of buy-in to change (on a scale of zero to 10). The SS TST® required the project 
manager to rate each stakeholder (see Appendix D stakeholder tool). 
Section III: Methods 
Context 
 The pre-operative surgical booking defect quality improvement project was implemented 
at a >300-bed acute care hospital in Texas. The sponsor of the project and a key stakeholder was 
the Chief Nursing Officer (CNO). Other key stakeholders for this project were the Director of 
Perioperative Services, the Lead Surgical Scheduler, the Chief of the Medical Staff, a 
service/product line physician champion (Orthopedics), the Director of Quality and Patient 
Safety, Director of Patient Care, a Patient/Customer Experience champion, a Clinical 
Informaticist, and the Surgical Liaison RN. Using the stakeholder analysis component of the SS 
TST®, the DNP project lead assessed 10 stakeholders and found eight were aware of the need for 
a process change and supportive of the proposed interventions.  
Interventions 
 The quality improvement project was the implementation of the pre-operative booking 
component of the Safe Surgery Targeted Solutions Tool® (SS TST®) to reduce variability in 
surgical booking procedures, thus mitigating the risk of a wrong-site surgery or related “never” 
event within the perioperative continuum (e.g., wrong-site surgery.)  The intervention took place 
in two settings: 1) a hospital scheduling office where booking forms and phone calls are received 
and surgical procedures are scheduled, and 2) the physicians’ offices where the bookings and 








Safe Surgery Targeted Solutions Tool® 
The Joint Commission Center for Transforming Healthcare (CTH) developed the Safe 
Surgery Targeted Solutions Tool® (SS TST®) to map individual risk factors for wrong-site 
surgeries to solutions that mitigate them. This tool was used to define and target specific risks in 
the pre-op booking process of the microsystem for this project. Using the tool’s self-contained, 
data-driven process, specific defects are identified, targeted solutions are implemented, outcomes 
monitored, and sustainment strategies delivered. The SS TST® includes explanations of the 
surgical booking audit checklists and a video, along with a return-back demonstration within the 
tool. These components engaged the staff with the change management strategies CTH employs 
in Robust Process Improvement (RPI®). The SS TST® is predicated on the premise that the 
absence of a previous wrong-site surgery should not be taken as reassurance that it will not 
occur. Evaluation of process accuracy must occur to recognize where the risk lies. 
 The SS TST® has a “Toolkit” containing elements that follow the LSS define, measure, 
analyze, implement, and control (DMAIC) phases. Tab 1 is the “Define” Tab. The steps within 
Tab 2, the “Measure” Tab, are where the baseline data was gathered. Tab 3 is the “Analyze” tab. 
For the analysis phase of this project, proportion charts (p charts), Pareto charts, and analysis of 
means (ANOM) charts were produced to determine baseline defect rates (Appendix E). During 
this “Tab 3 phase,” the DNP project lead reviewed baseline data with the stakeholders to share 
expertise on the two most prevalent defects identified. Those findings were: 1) Receipt of Form 
Defects (surgeons’ offices not using any form, but rather calling surgical cases in to be booked) 
and 2) missing or incorrect information IF surgical booking forms were used (Appendix F). 
Following review and feedback from the stakeholders, the project lead mapped the targeted 






tools to “Implement” these solutions. The fifth tab is “Sustain the Gains,” which translates to the 
“Control” phase of the define, measure, analyze, improve, control (DMAIC) sequence of Lean 
Six Sigma.  
Gap Analysis  
The gap analysis included the steps of the quality improvement project, which also follow 
the DMAIC concept within Lean, Six Sigma. In the Define portion of the gap analysis, the 
current state was that the hospital perioperative staff were unaware that WSS risk events resided 
within their realm of practice (Appendix G). The desired state was to introduce the SS TST® Pre-
op Booking Project to the hospital with the goal that WSS events would never occur, especially 
with surgical booking as a cause or contributing factor. Next, within the Measure portion of the 
gap analysis, an assessment of existing literature regarding pre-op scheduling processes took 
place, as there are not many studies to reference which have had successful measurable 
outcomes. Additionally, noted within the current state, the DNP project lead measured hospital 
baseline pre-op booking defects/risks for WSS from SS TST® entries, which required a minimum 
of 100 initial observations entered by physician ID/code and service. To reach the desired state, 
the determined risks were calculated and disseminated to stakeholders. Within the Analyze 
phase, the current state demonstrated no apparent standardized methods utilized to schedule 
surgical cases at the hospital. The desired state was to identify multiple entry points and methods 
to schedule surgeries at the hospital and determine those root causes that could have contributed 
to WSS within their perioperative arena. For the Implement Solutions current state, a change 
management strategy was implemented at the hospital. The desired state was continued 
implementation of the change strategy with targeted solutions throughout the hospital’s 






current state recognized the hospital’s perioperative leadership as unfamiliar with the SS TST® 
implementation guide. The desired state was consistent leadership facilitation of the 
implementation guide and sustainment of the gains (e.g., process standardization). 
Gantt Chart   
The initial Gantt chart established during the third semester of the DNP program was 
adjusted according to the time frame plausibility for the project lead and feedback from facility 
key stakeholders as well as leaders from the CTH. The QI project was initially projected to take 
16 weeks. After consultation, the original timeline was adjusted to 32 weeks to accommodate the 
lack of consecutive weeks the project lead would be at the facility to perform the project, 
COVID-19, and unanticipated events within the hospital. The Gantt chart displays actual 
timeline adjustments, with key targets inclusive of prospectus, QI project text development, QI 
project presentation, and graduation. See Appendix H for the Gantt Chart.  
Work Breakdown Structure  
The project lead was responsible for providing SS TST® orientation, direction, and 
training on the tool related to the DMAIC principles and components built into the program. The 
project lead evaluated all baseline pre-op booking defects to determine which targeted solutions 
were required to mitigate those risks and evaluated post-intervention preoperative booking 
defects to calculate the proportion chart, the Pareto chart, and the analysis of means (ANOM). 
The Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) contributed to managing each deliverable for the project 
(Appendix I). The WBS provided a visual tool to implement each step of the project (Martinelli 
& Milosevic, 2016). The WBS outlined the achievement goal, project definition, and the steps 
that followed, including the stakeholder analysis and charter development. The baseline number 






determine the next step, analyzing defects. In the analysis phase, the methods used to schedule 
surgical cases were examined for root causes of defects. The most prevalent defects were 
mapped to solutions. In the Implement Solutions phase, the project lead implemented the 
solutions and shared best practices with the key stakeholders, with the intent to Control/Sustain 
Gains. 
Responsibility/Communication Plan 
 The DNP project lead was solely responsible for project communication (Appendix J). 
The communication methods were virtual (via Zoom, Skype calls, phone calls), in person, and 
written communication (email and texts). Key communication points were the stakeholder 
kickoff meeting, the project charter development, the project status report, the project review, 
and a debrief of project results. The DNP project lead conferred weekly with the DNP project 
advisor and monthly with the hospital CNO, who facilitated communication at the corporate 
level to help move the project forward and sustain the results. The Chief of the Medical Staff was 
the project champion who communicated directly with the project surgeons. The Director of 
Quality and Patient Safety introduced key members of the hospital and corporate staff to the 
project lead to facilitate progress of the project. The Director of Perioperative Services, the 
Director of Patient Care, the Lead Surgical Scheduler, and the Surgical Liaison RN were 
instrumental in collecting and disseminating pre and post intervention statistics to all surgeons’ 
offices involved.  
SWOT Analysis  
A SWOT analysis was conducted to understand issues with potential impact on the 
project. The organization’s strengths were within the CNO and Director of Perioperative 






standardized pre-op booking process (Appendix K). The organization is very performance-
improvement-driven and a Magnet© Recognition Facility. An area of weakness was the project 
lead not knowing the CMO or any product line chiefs. The project lead did not have internal 
contacts with staff as an employee and thus originally lacked the ability to obtain information 
informally or make spur-of-the-moment observations.  
Opportunities were determined to be the project leader's ability to leverage evidence-
based quality improvement methods from other organizations (e.g., The Joint Commission and 
the Center for Transforming Healthcare). There was an opportunity for the project lead to 
publish aggregate findings from other organizations to add to the body of knowledge on 
mitigating risks from pre-operative booking defects. Other opportunities were being able to share 
best practices from external organizations. Threats included inadequate evidence in the literature 
on surgical booking as a contributing factor for WSS, and lack of awareness by hospital system 
leadership of pre-operative booking as a risk factor warranting attention, limiting the ability to 
scale the project. As there were multiple entry points (approximately 60 for this facility) and 
scheduling modalities for surgical scheduling, physician offices often had no direct affiliation 
with the location where surgery is performed, confusion and miscommunication did increase the 
risk of WSS. 
Budget  
The first component evaluated with the budget included the staff who were required to 
contribute time to the success of this project (Appendix L). This budget included the project lead 
obtaining baseline and post-intervention data and communicating project status for 40 hours per 
week for 2 weeks per month ($4,480/month x 10 months) for a total of $44,800. Three outside 






call 1 hour/month for 4 months = $224, and a Data Analyst consultant who performed data 
extraction for 1 hour/week for 10 months for 4 weeks per month (once a week) = $2400, and the 
other was a Director within the outside consultant group who provided project oversight 1 
hour/week for 10 months x 4 weeks per month = $4800. The Perioperative Director met with the 
project lead 1 hour/ week for 10 months x 2 weeks per month = $2400. CNO 
guidance/support/Stakeholder update meeting 2 times/month for 10 months = x4 hours/month 2 
x’s/month = $4800. The Anesthesia Champion attended the stakeholder update meeting once a 
month x 10 months = $3650. The Chief of the Medical Staff met with the project lead 2 times/ 
month x 2 hours = $1471.80 to review progress and facilitate project continuation. The hospital 
surgical schedulers met with the project lead for 8 hours/month x 10 months = $1325.60, and the 
physician office surgical schedulers met 4 hours/month x 10 months = $662.80. This total cost 
for staff to implement the project totals $66,534.20. The second component was a corporate IT 
investment estimated at $67,520.00 within the initial year launch to update the surgical 
scheduling website, bringing the first-year total investment cost estimate to $134,064.20, with a 
three-year cost of implementation projection totaling $202,411.20. 
In addition to the costs projected to implement the SS TST®, each WSS comes with the 
estimated average cost as greater than $179K per case (Mehtsun, 2013). With a consistent 
estimate of 40-50 WSSs within the United States every week, this totals over $465M in tangible 










Study of the Interventions 
 The rationale for choosing these interventions was the evidence-based efficacy of the 
SS TST®, its demonstrated validity, and its direct correlation decreasing risks of never events 
after implementation of the targeted solutions. The approach chosen to assess the impact of 
the interventions was gathering the post-intervention data to measure an anticipated decrease   
in defect rate. The data would also provide information on changes in surgical schedulers’ 
satisfaction with preoperative booking post-intervention. The approach used to establish 
whether the observed outcomes were due to the interventions was using the built-in 
mechanism for calculations within the SS TST® and collecting responses from the surgical 
schedulers.  
Outcome Measures  
 The outcome measures (number and types of pre-booking defects) were illustrated with 
proportion-charts (p charts), Pareto charts, and analysis of means (ANOM) diagrams (Appendix 
M). Rationale for expressing the outcomes this way was that these charts and diagrams are built 
into the SS TST® and show the change from baseline defects to post-intervention improvements 
as a quantitative indicator of mitigating WSS risk. These measures were created and validated by 
CTH to evaluate the effectiveness of implementing the targeted solutions, thus, no new measures 
needed to be developed or validated for this project. CTH has determined the accuracy of data 
for the project work to have a p-value of 0.000 of 0.000. A table showing the p-value calculation 









Data Collection Instruments 
The Center for Transforming Healthcare provided the data collection instruments where they 
have undergone validation from pilot facilities (Appendix N). These tools have had their 
reliability proven by measuring the process and outcomes over the past ten years with over 70 
facilities throughout the US. The measures chosen were the product lines at this facility with the 
greatest number of cases with laterality: orthopedics and cardiovascular services. The operational 
definitions are provided within the Safe Surgery Data Collection training module, and the 
qualified data collectors then enter data into this worksheet based upon their observations. The 
requirement from the CTH is at least 100 observations over at least two weeks are obtained to 
gather baseline and post-intervention data. The DNP project lead created the data collection 
instrument to evaluate surgical schedulers under the guidance of the project committee chair. An 
analysis of quantitative and qualitative data obtained from the surgical scheduler staff related to 
staff satisfaction with their training and role satisfaction with the current processes and 
subsequent satisfaction with the changes to the workflow were measured.  
Analysis 
  A mixed-methods study was performed. The quantitative testing measured the percentage 
of risk for never events. A quantitative and qualitative study was performed pre- and post-
intervention to evaluate surgical scheduler satisfaction utilizing the SS TST®. The quantitative 
data analysis was performed using the Microsoft Excel Mini tab in the SS TST® to collate and 
extrapolate the data. Qualitative data was collected and analyzed to determine perceived risks, 
methods, and processes whereby the physician office scheduling staff viewed the importance of 






Post Intervention Data and Appendix P for Surgical Scheduler Quality Improvement 
Questionnaire.  
Ethical Considerations 
An initial review by the project lead and project sponsor did not reveal any ethical 
considerations that indicated the need for a formal ethics review. No conflicts of interest were 
identified. Data collected was masked (using patient codes and a numeric coding system for both 
the hospital and pilot physicians alike) and aggregated to avoid any breach of confidentiality, 
standard practice embedded in the SS TST®. All data shared externally is anonymous and shared 
with the explicit permission of the hospital. The data used in this study is aggregated and de-
identified; no representation can be made to the type of facility where defects were identified. 
Hospital staff (the three in-house schedulers and the Administrative Assistant to the Director of 
Perioperative Services) who entered data or comments have their anonymity protected through 
masking codes. The DNP project lead has an Affiliation Agreement with both the hospital and 
the Joint Commission Center for Transforming Healthcare (Appendix Q). 
Another component within ethical consideration includes beneficence. Beneficence is 
defined within Grace’s text, this is a component of ethics, which urges those employed within 
the healthcare setting, to continue towards goals that were originally set forth to provide a 
service that ensures the patients’ greatest interests (2018). By measuring and identifying the 
greatest risks for wrong-site surgeries, evaluating the methods employed from surgeons’ 
offices to the hospital, the facility targeted the two highest risk categories at the entry point for 
surgery scheduling. This ethical principle was met because it is certainly within the best 






wrong-site, wrong-side, wrong-approach, wrong-procedure event (also known as “never 
events”). 
Autonomy is the ethical principle to ensure a patient’s authority to be cared for in a 
dignified and respectful manner (Grace, 2018). An effort whereby respecting all patients 
regarding their treatment includes their inherent trust in the healthcare professionals to reduce 
or eliminate anything known to be a risk. Implementing the safe surgery scheduling tool was a 
pointed example of how patients’ dignity and respect increased as their risk was decreased. 
The ethical principle known as veracity entails availing the truth to patients and 
allowing them transparent information regarding their health and care requirements (Grace, 
2018). This principle enabled the autonomy and propagated patients being able to make 
informed decisions. Over the past year, patients have given pointed feedback on their post-
operative surveys. Because the pre-operative process has been very disjointed, they have 
questioned faith in the pre-operative process. It added to their being more apprehensive on 
their day of surgery. This apprehension was a driving force in the Customer Satisfaction 
revamping of this pre-op process to make it more streamlined, standardized, and safer. Giving 
these patients this transparency that a performance improvement process has been put into 
place emphasizes veracity with this population. 
The concept of restorative or compensatory justice involves reinstating that entity to 
people which they may have lost due to the actions or inactions of others (Grace, 2018). This 
principle can be applied both to patients and staff members alike. This project targeted the 
patients, to reinstate trust and satisfaction with this facility, which was diminished due to the 
fractured management of this process. The physician office and hospital surgical scheduling 






the norm versus telephonic scheduling, to decrease risk and disparate verbal surgical bookings 
actual orders received within the Pre-Admit Clinic. The tenet of “justice as fairness,” was 
inclusive as this project ensured fairness and equitability were ingrained across this continuum 
of decreasing risk of never events. 
This project sought to ensure psychological safety also for the patients and staff 
members. “Psychological safety is the shared belief that the team is safe for interpersonal risk-
taking. Its presence improves innovation and error prevention” (Grailey, et al., 2021). The 
patients require psychological safety as they undergo surgery, giving their lives totally and 
completely to the anesthesia and surgical staff. This project supports psychological safety by 
providing staff and patients the knowledge and confidence risks for WSS have been 
thoroughly evaluated, measured, and mitigated by utilization of this methodology. 
There are six values known as the principles of the Jesuits (Creighton University, n.d.). 
First, may we advocate for our patients, may it be “Ad Majorem Dei Gloriam for the Greater 
Glory of God.” The SS TST® is allowing pre-operative booking staff, by reducing risk, to be 
bold patient advocates. As Florence Nightingale wrote in her diary, “Let me only accomplish the 
Will of God,” as we care for patients who are the center core of this project, may we only strive 
to do what we do, for our patients and our fellow healthcare providers “For the greater glory of 
God,” and not ourselves (Wellman, 1999). Another Jesuit principle is, “Forming and Educating 
Agents of Change: Teaching behaviors that reflect critical thought and responsible action on 
moral and ethical issues.” This principle drives what we do as healthcare educators, and as this 
DNP project lead has educated surgical booking staff as to what an important job they hold in 
minimizing or eliminating risk for WSS. An effort to help shape our current and future 






today’s world where moral and ethical matters (e.g., to keep our patients free from wrong-site 
surgeries) are more pertinent to address than ever before in the history of our lives. 
 The ANA Ethical Standards has nine provisions, of which several were relevant to this 
project. Provision 1 is, “Respect for Others” with these items listed within the subsets.1.1 The 
Respect for Human Dignity,1.2 Relationships with Patients,1.3 The Nature of Health,1.4 The 
Right to Self-Determination, and 1.5 Relationships with Colleagues and Others. Respect for 
others is undoubtedly number one on ANA’s list of ethical standards. Healthcare professionals 
must first and foremost respect others in every situation, if even respectfully disagreeing, and 
advocate for patients, families, and staff members. Focusing on provision 1.5 allows for all we 
meet, we must respect, especially regarding relationships with colleagues, advocating for patient 
safety and striving to alleviate any deviation or potential for WSS. The second Provision is: 
“Commitment to the Patient,” with these items listed as subsets: 2.1 Primacy of the Patient’s 
Interests, 2.2 Conflict of Interest for Nurses, 2.3 Collaboration, and 2.4 Professional Boundaries. 
Commitment to the patient is a primary focus within the project and ensures the highest quality, 
most informed, and safe care possible. This commitment comes in education to the patient care 
teams including surgical schedulers and all within the perioperative continuum. Allocating 
resources and educational training modules is an aspect of commitment to the patient, 
considering WSS prevention. The third Provision is: “Advocacy for the Patient.” 3.1.4 
Professional Responsibility in Promoting a Culture of Safety, demonstrated by advocating for 
patients is an ethical provision whereby nurses must act in support of patients, by utilizing 







Section IV: Results 
The needs identified for this intervention, which were determined from the gap analysis, 
came first from the lack of identification and evaluation of inherent risk for WSS with targeted 
solutions (Appendix R), and second from the risk of lack standardization of the surgical booking 
process with a targeted solution. An additional gap was identified three months into this project 
as an informatics lack of agility. Most office surgical schedulers were not granted access to a 
surgical procedure request via the preferred online method. Additionally, the project lead 
collected qualitative data on the level of training and satisfaction of surgical schedulers with the 
pre-intervention process. Levels of training and satisfaction were measured again post-
intervention to ascertain changes in schedulers’ perspectives towards their positions and the 
scheduling process at large. 
The process measure findings for the SS TST® were gathered from the baseline data. 
Targeted solutions were then put into place for the two identified greatest risks for this facility. 
The baseline data for 100 scheduled surgical cases revealed 70% of surgeries were scheduled 
over the phone (see Appendix E). The SS TST® showed that the greatest measured risks were: 1) 
the risk of verbal/telephonic surgical scheduling, and 2) lack of or misinformation and no written 
changes when made to the surgery schedule. These highlighted the targeted solutions put into 
place. The initial findings from the six surgery schedulers revealed three had over three years in 
their positions and three respondents had less than three years performing surgical scheduling. 
Experienced schedulers had higher job satisfaction levels than those with fewer years’ 
experience (Appendix P). 
The SS TST® timeline for the initial steps was adjusted as described in the Gantt Chart 






The project lead was able to meet with one of the surgical schedulers, the Surgery Liaison RN, 
the Director of Quality and Patient Safety, and the Performance Improvement Director in 
January 2021 to conduct a project mapping session as a starting point (Appendix S). The Pre-
Admit Clinic (PAC) performed chart reviews prior to surgery and identified incorrect booking 
(CPT) codes which translated as errors (defects/risks) from scheduling to the patient going to 
Pre-Op. There was no way to verify a verbal booking. The project lead also completed the SS 
TST® Charter evaluation tool in January 2021. 
The initial steps of the interventions from each of these findings were to go to the providers’ 
offices in April 2021 to share the findings (Appendix T), share the risk, and request their 
participation in the pilot study to afford them the ability to participate in this project. All office 
surgical schedulers agreed to join the pilot project at this time, understanding the WSS risk, but 
only one office began utilizing the form. During the in-person visit in April, the DNP project 
lead disseminated the anonymous questionnaires to the surgical schedulers to determine baseline 
qualitative data (refer to Appendix O). To ensure anonymity the project lead had the schedulers 
mail their documents. Six of the eight schedulers returned the questionnaire (75% response rate), 
which was valuable in making recommendations to the Corporate Patient Experience Team and 
the Corporate IT/ISD Team with which the project lead was working. The initial findings also 
revealed scheduler overall satisfaction with online written versus verbal booking of surgical 
cases. Three of the five (60% response rate) post-intervention questionnaires distributed were 
returned (of note three of the original office schedulers vacated their positions during the project 
timeline). The SS TST® post-intervention surgical scheduler findings showed the surgical 
scheduler levels of experience were evenly distributed. The common post-intervention findings 






errors and disparities between those phoned in versus booked electronically. Unanimously 
(100%) of the schedulers recognized the benefits of booking electronically versus over the 
telephone. These findings also solidified the premise predicated by the SS TST®. The corporate 
IT Team is still currently working to streamline this process to support both the office and in-
hospital schedulers due to the findings discovered during this project. The SS TST® post-
intervention data reviewed 148 scheduled surgical cases, which decreased from an 88% error rate 
to a 41% error rate for surgical cases which were scheduled verbally. The overall results show a 
relative improvement of 53.4% over a three-month period.  
Modifications had to be made to the project. Most changes were made due to unanticipated 
events (internal, weather, COVID-19) and poor utilization of the form. Multiple challenges were 
ensuring all the pilot offices would use the SS TST® scheduling form. The impact of COVID-19 
on surgical scheduling had an outsized effect on the project throughout the implementation 
phase. A surge of COVID patients impacted the entire operations of the project facility from July 
through October 2021. All non-emergent surgeries were canceled, and no new surgeries could be 
booked. The recovery room was converted to a COVID unit. The operating room nurses were 
being utilized elsewhere in the hospital, again requiring a timeline and project plan modification.  
Contextual elements that interacted with the interventions and could account for the 
outcomes/delays in progress for this project had an unequivocal underpinning of the effects of 
COVID on the medical communities at large. The project lead found literature that shared the 
same phenomenon worldwide due to the pandemic. Surgeries were cancelled and prioritization 
of cases (oncology patients for example) which were allowed to be scheduled (only on a case-by-
case basis) were defined and authorized in a parallel manner which is described by Soreide, et al 






measured yet, due to the delay in surgeries for so many patients. The model, “Pandemic burden 
and impact on surgical services,” (Appendix V) found within Soreide’s article highlight the 
cascade of events which would be perpetuated by continued delay or cancelation of surgical 
procedures for those requiring surgical interventions (Soreide, et al., 2020). 
There were several observed associations between outcomes, interventions, and 
contextual elements, the greatest of which was inconsistent continuity in project progression due 
to the lack of the project lead being on-site continuously during the project; this was not 
favorable for project forward movement. The project lead did not have direct authority with any 
of the staff members responsible for the project's success. The project lead was reliant upon 
others, and as such the project lead realized the project was likely not as successful, progress did 
not occur as rapidly as possible. Contextual elements played a large part in this project.  
Another phenomenon which added to the outcome timeline and the interventions, was 
that the project lead discovered that Rogers' theory of Diffusion was a key player in getting buy-
in and acceptance of the change required from the office schedulers. The project lead realized the 
importance of following the SS TST® recommendations from the targeted solutions. Those 
recommendations required a mandate of intervention implementation within one month of 
obtaining baseline data. The DNP project lead realized the necessity of being more vigilant in 
implementing that portion of the timeline would have avoided the prolonged implementation 
phase of this project. The project lead realized that the SS TST® was the project lead’s 
innovation and vision, yet that did not make this everyone else’s project.  
Eight months into the project, the project lead was made aware of multiple emails sent 
back and forth among the pre-admit clinic nurses and the hospital surgical schedulers. These 






documented on the surgical consent and orders obtained in the PAC. Identifying these 
discrepancies was an eye-opening event for both the DNP project lead and the Risk Management 
Director when these were quantified (over 70 within 3 months). Another lesson learned through 
this process was that the surgical schedulers realized “surgical set cards” are a “guess” because 
there are numerous options to pull from and no direction from the surgeons’ schedulers when 
scheduling surgery. This lack of direction can and has caused the incorrect surgical sets to be 
pulled for cases if not scrutinized and caught by the perioperative nursing team during surgical 
schedule review “huddle” the business day prior to the surgeries. 
The unintended consequences, including the benefits, problems, failures, or costs 
associated with the interventions, and how these were mitigated, were widespread. The benefits, 
which were not something the project lead envisioned being a by-product, were that the Pre-
Admit Clinic, by joining forces with this project, was able to increase procurement of orders for 
patients arriving for their Pre-Admit appointments. There was a noted improvement of 
approximately 95%, according to the Surgical Liaison RN, from the pilot offices the project lead 
interfaced with, who were unaware of the impact of not sending orders promptly, and this was a 
tremendous, unexpected win. The problems, as discussed prior, were the lack of ability of the 
DNP project lead to have continuous effort to move the project forward, sometimes with greater 
than a month with no interaction with the pilot offices. The project could and likely would have 
been successful far earlier if the project lead was onsite every day for the SS TST® 16-week 
timeline. This schedule was adjusted to meet the realistic timeline in which the project lead could 
be on site. The failures discovered also tied in with the lack of onsite continuity and a personal 
understanding of the facility’s process flow, the key players involved, and the best mechanism to 






was a Microsoft Word® document with shifting fields to be populated. As such, it drove some 
schedulers to hand-write in their surgical scheduling information. The mitigation for this was to 
work with the hospital clinical informaticist to produce a populatable form, or perhaps drive the 
actual update of the scheduling link to move faster than planned, as IT saw this as a stumbling 
block well. 
The initial improvement plan evolved. The project lead presented to the hospital 
leadership in May 2021 and shared that the implementation phase of the new form would be 
captured during that month, with post-intervention feedback being captured, collated, and 
calculated within the month of June 2021. The project lead planned a follow-up presentation of 
post-intervention findings to the leadership team again in July 2021, which was delayed due to 
the abovementioned situations. Thus, alternative change strategies were considered and rejected, 
pushing the implementation phase into July with those reasons mentioned above. This evolution 
occurred because of lack of compliance and the project lead was solely responsible (with the 
guidance of the Chief of the Medical Staff) for this change of plans. 
The noted effects the changes and improvements had on clinical and organizational 
outcomes and processes included discovering lack of preoperative booking standardization 
throughout the corporate entity. The Corporate IT office realized there was a process developed 
and shared throughout the corporation to improve how the office surgical schedulers entered 
their surgical requests. Still, this process was not being utilized uniformly. For example, the 
hospital where the project lead was implementing the project, started with a 70% verbal 
scheduling measurement. When the project lead shared this metric with a corporate clinical 
informaticist, it was realized that the central corporate hospital location had an average 90% 






facilities. This concern was ultimately shared with the hospital where the project lead was 
inculcated. The modality which was used at the central corporate hospital was implemented with 
a 53.4% relative improvement demonstrated at the SS TST® project site. The professional 
outcomes and processes were considered a win across the corporate enterprise as the leadership 
saw the initial data and supported the change, which was implemented, for a marked decrease in 























Section V: Discussion 
Summary 
 This project demonstrated the tireless efforts that must go into change management, even 
when the risks are clearly identified. It is the opinion of the DNP project lead that the SS TST® is 
a tool that could not succeed without a committed team of leadership and implementation 
advocates. Despite meeting many obstacles, the executive team never took focus off the 
identified risk. Using the Facilitating Change® Model, this team was able to drive change by 
becoming aware of and alleviating factors contributing to risk. 
Interpretation 
The nature of associations between the interventions and the outcomes revealed a direct 
correlation between decreasing risk of WSS and preventing never events. The impact of the 
project on people and systems was more efficient communications. The Chief of Medical Staff 
has defined this as a target during the two-year tenure in this position to streamline the entire 
perioperative continuum, focusing on the preoperative booking as a first step to improve and 
accomplish this goal. The Director of Quality and Patient Safety stated this project has unearthed 
many hidden risks and made such a difference in how the facility views the perioperative 
process, and views this as a breakthrough in how the facility will handle preoperative booking in 
the future.  
There were multiple reasons for differences between observed and anticipated outcomes 
directly due to context. The strongest reason identified throughout the entire implementation and 
closure of this project was the unanticipated lack of compliance with the pilot offices' request 
and the need to have an authoritative mandate to require these offices to comply. The project 






impact on all healthcare workers included vast numbers of cancellations and rescheduling of 
cases for surgical patients. The costs and strategic trade-offs included the project lead engaging 
with the non-compliant offices three times to ask them to comply. The opportunity costs were the 
time and effort involved with the quantified cost avoidance from a WSS. The implications of 
these findings for the leadership of change decrease the risk for a never event. The facility will 
need to assign staff to sustain these gains after the project lead completes this initial project. 
Assumptions were made that all staff would see the risk and want to comply, this did not end up 
uniformly being the case.  
The findings supported the Donabedian Medical Quality Improvement Theoretical 
Framework and Rogers Theory of Diffusion beyond the project lead’s expectations. One of the 
five office schedulers was an “innovator,” who used the new form immediately, gave constant 
feedback on how the form could be better laid out, and information which could be added. This 
scheduler was motivated by the possibility of change and wanted to reduce the risk of medical 
errors. Two of the five office schedulers were the “late majority.” They did not schedule enough 
cases at this facility to grasp the concept of how much they played a part in accepted risk for 
WSS. The project director communicated with them during the implementation, and after 
approximately three months, they saw the benefit and began scheduling online on the approved 
form. The last two schedulers, who booked the most surgeries, were “laggards.” They did not 
want to participate, their employers supported continuation of verbal scheduling, and they 
preferred to call rather than book online. The pilot form given to these five schedulers was not in 
an optimal format for use. One of the two “laggards” filled out the form twice and reverted to 
calling, and the other scheduler refused completely to book online until it was mandated by 






to take different approaches and provide different explanations of why schedulers should not be 
booking via telephone to move towards adoption.  
The inferences from this work regarding means necessary to sustain the spread of the new 
levels of performance are pointedly described with the leadership requirement above, to appoint 
a staff member as the maintaining force to ensure all physician offices eventually adopt and 
comply with online booking versus verbal booking. The DNP project lead is hopeful this 
improvement will be spread to other facilities within the corporate entity. The implications of 
this work for future professional staff development entail assigning a ‘point person’ to monitor 
and sustain the gains and potentially assign a member within the Pre-Operative department at the 
hospital to continue this initiative and ultimately roll out the other three components within the 



















The most notable limitation was a lack of buy-in from two physicians’ offices to 
implement the targeted solutions. Data were gathered pre-and post-implementation and 
schedulers in the physician offices were encouraged to implement the targeted solutions, but 
it was at their discretion. A change in the overall makeup of surgical cases affected the types 
of booking defects identified and limited the generalizability of the results. The COVID-19 
pandemic imposed a third limitation with multiple surges, which resulted in the cancellation 
of elective surgeries, a great proportion of which were orthopedic. Internet and email 
limitations at specific providers offices reduced their surgical scheduling staff’s ability to 
comply with the requested pilot utilization of the on-line surgical scheduling form. The bias 
this creates from being unable to access the internet or the approved online form skews the 
data due to these offices lacking technological resources to perform their jobs. 
Conclusions  
The purpose of the project was to standardize preoperative booking processes to decrease 
the risk for never events. The project demonstrated utilization of the SS TST® improved 
standardization and decreased risks for wrong-site surgeries. The results were consistent with 
evidence from the literature, and expectations from the project lead, which predicted a marked 
reduction in risk from standardizing the preoperative booking process. The short-term 
implications of this project were the introduction of a practical way for both in-hospital and 
surgeon office schedulers to decrease risks of wrong-site surgeries. This risk was remedied by 
implementing a surgical booking form, including all required patient information and complete 
surgical scheduling components needed for the operative team executing the surgical procedures 






processes on decreasing this WSS risk, providing an opportunity for future research to close this 
gap. Integrating a standardized preoperative booking process into “standard work” is necessary 
to sustain the process improvement demonstrated by the DNP project.  
Section VI: Funding 
 The project did not receive any formalized funding. The project lead volunteered 
personal time and efforts for this project. The hospital funded the project with time and staff 
members required to support the necessary efforts to complete this risk evaluation. The outside 
consultant leaders and the support provided by the stakeholders was part of their salaried 
positions. The opportunity exists for future grant funding or salaried positions to assist with 
continuing this evaluation to reduce identified risks for a continued Safe Surgery program 
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-Rapid timeline for data entry 
--rough data was received 
early within the study, but a 
complete analysis was able to 
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-Selection bias due to being 
hospital-based patients 
-Possible QI strategies could 
be utilized in other specialties 
as not isolated to being helpful 
in surgical setting 
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-The results from the VHA 
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non-VHA patient populations 
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 Appendix B 
 Robust Process Improvement® Diagram 
 
 










P Value Calculation for Baseline SS TST® Pre-Op Booking Data  
 
Source: Center for Transforming Healthcare Aggregate Baseline Values for Pre-Op Booking  
 
Total Observations = 12, 915 
Baseline Observations = 5,735 
Improve Observations = 7,180 
  
Baseline Observations 5,735 x .55 = 3,154 Defective Observations 
Improve Observations = 7,180 x .24 = 1,723 Defective Observations 




























































































































































































































































































• Supportive leadership 
-CNO and Perioperative Director 
• Multiple entities recognize lack of pre-op booking standardization 
• Very Performance Improvement-Driven Organization 
• Three-time Magnet© Recognition Facility w/ EBP reigning throughout 




• Project lead does not know CMO or Product Line Chief  
• Unknown actual timeline 
• Unsure if upon initial evaluation will actually find defects          




• Ability to consolidate proven improvement methods 
• Outside hospitals/healthcare organizations (HCOs) able to learn from 
TST data 
• Ability to potentially publish aggregate findings to aid other HCOs’ 
progress to decrease WSS 
• Ability to utilize RPI, LSS, CRM, HRO principles 
• Create strategy to share best practices with external organizations 
• There is a definite need for more research regarding surgical 
scheduling/booking 
• With COVID-19 there have been positive changes requiring a greater 
number of steps pre-operatively to decrease ‘rapid add-ons’ 
THREATS (external): 
 
• Not adequate research on surgical scheduling/booking and contributing 
factors for WSS 
• Not one size fits all for checklists or HCOs/settings 
• Multiple entry points into surgical scheduling 
• Often physician offices have no direct affiliation with the location surgery 
is performed 













       Staff   
 
Costs & Budget 





Yr 2 Yr 3 
Project Lead  40 hours/week/ 
2weeks per month 
$44,800 $45,427 $46,062 
RN Consultant  (once a month 
consultation x1 
hour x4 months) 
=$224 
$224 $227.13 $230.30 
Data Analyst 
Consultant 
 (data extraction) 
(x10 months x 4 
weeks/month (once 
a week) x1 hour 
each week 
$2400 $2434 $2468 
Project Oversight 
Consultant 
  x10 months x 
4wks/month (once 
a week) x1 hour 
each week 
$4800 $4867 $4935 
Peri-op Director  2x’s a month x1 hr 
x10 months)  
$2400 $2434 $2468 
CNO  support/Stakeholde
r update meeting 2 
x’s/month= x4 










 (2x’s a month x 10 
months   $178/hr ) 
$3650 $3701 $3753 
Chief of Medical 
Staff 







x 8 hrs/month x 10 
months  
 $1325.60 $1344 $1363 
Physician Office 
Surgical Schedulers 
x 4 hrs/month x 10 
months  
 $662.80 $672.07 $682 
TOTALS 
 
Costs for 3 years: 
$202,411.20 
























IT Cost Estimates 















Budget (cost avoidance) 
• Cost avoidance should be handled differently as a cost benefit analysis or cost effectiveness analysis. 
• Cost for loss of limb/life (avg $179K) National Practitioner Data Bank 
• Decrease/eliminate Perioperative Director and Patient Care Director daily texts/emails to confirm Pre-Admit Orders and 
for OR schedule day prior to surgery  
• Standardize process to decrease deviation/increased risk (eliminate redundancy and cost associated with this) 
• Decrease eliminate wasted OR time and opened/unused sets if wrong procedure or wrong approach set up (est. $16/min 
OR time, exclusive of Anesthesia or Surgeon avg $320/wrong side-wrong approach surgical set-up delays and cost) 
 
 
Budget (cost avoidance) 
Mitigating Strategy Cost Avoidance/Yr1 Yr2 Yr3 
Cost for WSS avg (NPDB) ~$179,000 $181,506 $184,047 
Decrease/Eliminate Periop 
and Surg Services Directors 
Texts/Emails daily 
~$62,400/yr $63,234 $64,119 
Standardize 
Process/decrease surgical 
schedulers’ on-phone hold 
time & RN “wasted” time 
Pre-Admit Clinic for 
patients arriving without 
orders 





OR time and opened/unused 
sets if wrong procedure or 
wrong approach set up (avg 
est. $16/min OR time, 
exclusive of Anesthesia or 
Surgeon, avg $320/wrong 
side-wrong approach 
$325 x 288/yr 
 
$93,600 








20 min turnover time to set 
up for new case) 
surgical set-up delays and 
cost ~288/year= $92,160 
TOTALS  
Cost Avoidance due to harm 
x3 years 
$378,549.56 $383,959.41 $400,984.08 
 
$1,163,493.05 





1. Per National Practitioner Data Base (NPDB) Mortality Rate for WSS 13.9% with a mean liability rate of $179K. 
2. # of events and patient days same in baseline periods (by definition, no events are prevented in baseline periods) 
3. Adverse Event Rate current baseline 75% 
4. Will see decreased # of events by ~50% each period Q1-Q4 
5. Annual Inflation Rate of 1.4% 









































































































































































Appendix P  



























Letters of Support from Agencies (redacted) 
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